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An Overview of Foreign Direct
Investment in Mexico
Brandon W Freeman*
Mexico's economic policy throughout most of the twentieth century has been found-
ed on the principle of self-sufficiency.' This perceived need for self-determination result-
ed in a tightly regulated, isolationist economy.2 Mexico's aversion to foreign economic
control and political influence can be traced back to the administration of Porfirio Diaz
(1876-1911).3 By the end of President Diaz's administration, productive enterprise in
Mexico was dominated by foreign capital, and over half the country's wealth was foreign
owned.4 The large foreign presence in Mexico's economy generated strong anti-foreign
sentiment and eventually resulted in the Mexican Revolution of 1910.5
The principles behind the Mexican Revolution of 1910 included sovereignty and inde-
pendence from foreign, economic, and political control. 6 These principles were embodied
in the Mexican Constitution of 1917. 7 The Mexican Constitution of 1917 is the founda-
tion for the isolationist economic policy and many of the laws that have discouraged and,
in some areas, prevented foreign direct investment in Mexico for more than seventy years.8
Specific policies that have discouraged foreign direct investment in Mexico include: (1) the
prohibition of foreigners from owning land within a restricted zone;9 (2) restraints on the
creation, modification, liquidation, and transfer of Mexican stock;10 (3) the prohibition of
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Southern Methodist University School of Law; Articles Editor, International
Law Review Association of SMU.
1. Michael W. Goldman et al., An Introduction to Direct Foreign Investment in Mexico, 5 IND. INT'L. &
COMP. L. REv. 101, 101 (1994).
2. Id.
3. Gloria L. Sandrino, The Nafta Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A
Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259,279 (1994).
4. Id.
5. Sandrino, supra note 3, at 281.
6. Id. at 283.
7. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS CONST. reprinted in
CONSTrrUTONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds.,
Gilbert H. Flanz & Louise Morenotrans., Oceana Publications, Inc. vol. XII 1988)(1971) (here-
inafter CONSTITUTION]. The 1917 Constitution remains in effect with significant amendments.
8. WHITING, supra note 4, at 55-79.
9. See CONsTrunoN, supra note 7, art. 27.
10. ALEXANDER C. HOAGLAND, JR., COMPANY FORMATION IN MExicO B-2 (1980).
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majority ownership l and majority control12 by foreigners in certain industries; and (4)
discriminatory taxation, the awarding of government contracts on a discriminatory basis,
and the selective use of permits and licenses. 13 Other factors that have discouraged foreign
investment include: (1) the expropriation of foreign owned companies; 14 (2) political
insurrection;15 and (3) currency inconvertibility. 16
In the last few years, Mexico's economic policy has undergone a dramatic reformation
from isolationism to a more open, free market economy.' 7 In 1993 the Mexican Congress
adopted a new Foreign Investment Law (FIL) that encourages foreign participation in the
Mexican economy.' 8 In 1994 Mexico entered into the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States. 19 "Chapter 11 of NAFTA
(Investment Chapter...) establishes a liberalized investment regime that expands the pro-
tection of foreign investors and investments.... '20 In conjunction with the NAFTA, Mexico
signed the U.S./Mexico tax treaty which minimizes the burden of double taxation.2 1
11. See Michael W. Gordon, The Joint Venture as an Institution for Mexican Development:. A Legislative
History, A 1978 ARIz. ST. L. J. 173, 183.
12. See Sandra F Maviglia, Mexico's Guidelines for Foreign Investment. The Selective Promotion of
Necessary Industries, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 281,285 (1986).
13. See ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLITICAL CONFLICT U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 20-21 (Jorge I.
Dominguez ed., 1982).
14. In 1938 Mexico expropriated all foreign owned oil companies. HARRY K. WRIGHT, FOREIGN
ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO 70 (1971). This oil industry was one of the largest blocks of foreign capi-
tal in the country. Id.
15. "Losses from damage" to or the destruction or disappearance of tangible assets caused by politi-
cally motivated acts of war or civil disturbance in the host country. Daniel, A New World for
PoliticalRisk Investment Insuranc4 RISK MANAGEMENT Oct. 1994, at 30, 32.
16. "[I]nvestors inability to convert local currency returns (profits, principal, interest, royalties, capi-
tal and other remittances) into foreign exchange for transfer outside the host country. Wagner,
supra note 15, at 32.
17. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 101.
This 'economic miracle' contrasts greatly with the debt stricken Mexico of the
early 80's. Salinas initiated this economic restructuring to repair the damages
caused by decades of overly protectionist practices that staggered the Mexican
economy. This process of structural adjustment is coistantly developing, and if
this development continues, Mexico's economic future will be bright.
Guillermo Marrero, What Foreigners Should Know About the Mexican Market, in NAFTA: WHAT
You NEED TO KNOW Now 1994, at 117, 124 (PLI Com'I Law & Practice Market, Course
Handbook Series No. A4-4466).
18. "Ley de inversi6n extranjera' L.I.E.D.O., 27 de diciembre de 1993, reprinted in Mexico: Foreign
InvestmentAct of 1993,33 I.L.M. 207 (Jorge A. Vargastrans., 1994) [hereinafter FIA].
19. North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) NAFTA.
20. Sandrino, supra note 3, at 262.
21. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and The Government of
the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 139 Cong. Rec. S16,857-59 (dailyed. Nov. 20, 1993).
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Through the adoption of legislation and international treaties, Mexico established an
economic policy that encourages and protects foreign direct investment.22 This comment
has three principal parts. The first section gives a brief overview of the important implica-
tions of Mexico's FIL and the NAFTA regarding foreign direct investment. The second sec-
tion gives an overview of the various business enterprises available to foreign investors and
the pros and cons of operating under each. The third section discusses two NAFTA side
agreements regarding the enforcement of Mexico's labor and environmental laws with
respect to their impact on the foreign investor.
I. 1993 Foreign Investment Law.
On December 28, 1993 Mexico adopted a new federal statute entitled the 1993
Foreign Investment Law (FIL). 23 The purpose of the FIL "[is to formulate the rules to
channel foreign investment into the Nation and to ensure that said investment contributes
to the national development."24 The FIL covers all foreign direct investment in Mexico.25
A foreign investor is defined as anyone, corporate or individual, other than a Mexican.26
The FIL opens new areas of investment to foreigners including certain sectors of the oil
service industry and the automobile industry.27 In addition, certain investors are allowed
to own property outright, which allows foreign investors who have formed Mexican cor-
porations the freedom to choose and to negotiate their own locations. 28 Furthermore, for-
eign investors are no longer required to have Mexican partners, but are allowed to control
the business alone.29 The FIL also establishes less ambiguous and less time consuming
registration procedures for foreign investors.30 In effect, the FIL brings Mexico's common
law into symmetry with requirements established under the NAFTA_31
22. See John M. Vernon & Carole A. Azulaye, A Guide to Implementing Mexico's New Foreign
Investment Law, 13 FRANCHISE L.J. 105, 128 (1994). See also Eric Griego, The Labor Dimension of
the NAFTA: Reflections on the First Year, 12 ARiz. J. INr'L & CoMp. L. 473, (1995) (noting signifi-
cant investment barriers in the investment climate in Mexico prior to NAFTA, and the NAFrA's
elimination of those barriers); Sandrino, supra note 3, at 327 (noting that Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA represents a major departure from Mexico's previous position on foreign investment and
international economic relations creating a hospitable environment for foreign investment
amongst its signatories); Goldman, supra note 1, at 125 (noting that under Mexico's new policy
regarding foreign investment, investors can assure themselves of an ever growing market of con-
sumers). But see Mahmood A. Zaidi, Employment, Trade and Foreign Investment Effects of
NAFTA, Minn. J. Global Trade 333 (1996) (using empirical data to illustrate how the NAFTA will
have a relatively small impact on the U.S. economy).








31. Goldman, supra note 1, at 114.
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A. PARTICIPATION IN MEXICAN COMPANIES.
The most significant departure from Mexico's traditional treatment of foreign direct
investment is rooted in article 4 of the FIL. 32 Article 4 allows foreign investors to control
100 percent of capital stock in a Mexican enterprise, subject to specific limitations. 33 The
specific limitations referred to in article 4 are separated into three categories.34 The first
category includes activities reserved exclusively to the Mexican Government.3 5 These
activities include: (1) petroleum; (2) basic petrochemicals; (3) electricity; (4) nuclear ener-
gy; (5) radioactive materials; (6) satellite communications; (7) telegraph services; (8)
radiotelegraphy; (9) mail service; (10) railways; (11) issuance of paper money; (12)
mintage of currency; (13) control of ports, airports, and heliports; and (14) any other
activity specifically mentioned by applicable legal provisions.36 The second category is
activities reserved exclusively for the Mexican People or to Mexican companies with an
"Exclusion of Foreigners Clause." 36 These activities include: (1) domestic land transporta-
tion of passengers, tourists and cargo, not including messenger and express package ser-
vices; (2) retail sale of gasoline and the distribution of liquid petroleum gas; (3) radio and
television broadcasting services, excluding cable television; (4) credit unions; (5) develop-
mental banking institutions; and (6) rendering of professional and technical services. 38
Foreign investors cannot participate in the activities in these two categories either
directly or through the use of trusts, agreements, social or statutory covenants, pyramid
schemes, or any mechanism granting them control or participation. 39 The only exception
is through neutral investment, which is discussed later in this comment.40
The third category limits foreign participation in certain areas to set percentages.
These percentages are divided into five brackets: (1) up to 10 percent; (2) up to 25 percent;
(3) up to 30 percent; (4) up to 49 percent; and (5) over 49 percent. 41 The up to 10 percent
bracket includes cooperatives. 42 The up to 25 percent bracket includes domestic air trans-
32. Id. at 116.
33. FIL, supra note 18, art. 4. This article allows foreign investors to participate in any proportion in
the capital of Mexican corporations, the acquisition of fixed assets, the entering into any new
areas of economic activity or in the manufacturing of new lines of products, the opening and
management of commercial entities, or in the expansion or relocation of those already in exis-
tence, save what is provided by this act. I&.
34. Id. arts. 5,6,7, and 8.
35. Id. art. 5.
36. Id. Activities reserved exclusively to the Mexican Government under 1973 Foreign Investment
Law include: petroleum and other hydrocarbons; basic petrochemicals; exploitation of radioac-
tive minerals and the generation of nuclear energy; mining; electricity; railroads; telegraphic and
wireless communications; and other activities established in specific laws. "Reglamento de la ey
para promover la inversion mecicana y regular inversion extranjera," D.O., 16 de mayo de 1989
reprinted in DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, (Andrea Bonmo-Blanc & William E. Mooz, Jr. eds.,
Alexander Hoagland trans., vol. 2, pt. IV, app. 4 1989 (1980).
37. FIL, supra note 18, art. 6.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Goldman, supra note 1, at 118.
41. FIL, supra note 18, art. 7.
42. Id.
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portation, air taxi transport, and specialized air transportation. 43 The up to 30 percent
bracket includes controlling companies of financial groups, multiple banking credit insti-
tutions, stockmarket houses, and stock market specialists. 44 The up to 49 percent bracket
indudes insurance institutions, bond institutions, money exchange houses, manufacturing
and marketing of explosives, printing and publication of newspapers, cable television, tele-
phone services, fishing, port services of pilotage to ships, and services related to the rail-
road sector.45 The final bracket requires approval by the Foreign Investment Commission
(FIC)46 before a foreign investor may invest in over 49 percent in any of the following
activities: private education, legal services, securities appraisal institutions, insurance, cel-
lular telephones, construction of pipelines for transporting oil and gas, and drilling of oil
and gas wells. 47
B. REAL PROPERTY.
The Mexican Constitution prohibits foreigners from owning land within 100 kilome-
ters of Mexico's borders and within 50 kilometers of Mexico's coastline.48 This area is
known as the "restricted zone." 49 However, these restrictions have been eased by the FIL.
Mexican corporations having foreign shareholders may now acquire and hold real estate in
the restricted zone, provided that real estate is used for nonresidential purposes and the
purchase is registered with the FIC. 50 In order for a Mexican corporation to own property
in the restricted zone for residential purposes or for foreign natural persons or foreign
legal entities to own property in the restricted zone, a real estate trust must be created.51
Creating a real estate trust requires approval from the FIC.5 2 Upon approval, the FIC will




46. See, supra note 36. The 1973 Foreign Investment Law established the FIC in order to implement
the law and to supervise foreign investment. Id.
47. Id. art. 8.
48. CONsT. art. 27.
49. Id.
50. FI, supra note 18, art. 10.
51. Id. art. 11.
52. Id.
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as trustee, on property located in the restricted zone.53 Once the trust has been created,
the beneficiaries have full rights to the land, induding any benefit from a profit-making
operation and exploitation. 54 The FIL provides that real estate trusts are valid for fifty
years, and renewal is automatic and may continue indefinitely subject to FIC approval. 55
C. NEUTRAL INVESTMENT.
The FIL also expands a foreign investor's opportunity to invest in "neutral invest-
ments' 56 Neutral investment consists of that which is realized in Mexican companies that
is not taken into account in determining the percentage of foreign investment in the capi-
tal stock of Mexican companies. 57 Direct neutral investment may take the form of non-
voting shares in which the shareholder has the rights to pecuniary interests in the corpora-
tion, but only limited corporate rights. 58 Neutral investment shares issued to foreign
investors must be approved by the National Securities Commission. 59
D. SANCTIONS.
The FIL also provides several articles that permit sanctions for acts performed in con-
travention of the law.60 The sanctions range from fines to revocation of authorization to
conduct business in Mexico.6 1 The revocation of authority to do business results in the
nullification of all business and statutory agreements, and may be imposed on a Mexican
national, Mexican company, foreign national, or foreign legal entity.
62
II. North American Free Trade Agreement.
On January 1, 1994 Mexico entered into the NAFTA with the United States and
Canada, thereby creating a free trade area in which tariff and other barriers to trade are
greatly reduced.63 Chapter 11 of the NAFTA (Investment Chapter) represents a significant
shift in Mexico's economic policy regarding foreign investments, particularly with respect
to treatment, protection against dispossession, and compensation for expropriation of for-
eign owned property. 64
The NAFTA defines an investor as a NAFTA "Party or state enterprise thereof, or a
national or an enterprise of such Party, that seeks to make, is making or has made an
53. Goldman, supra note 1, at 120.
54. FIL, supra note 18, art. 12.
55. Id. art. 13.
56. Vernon &Azulaye, supra note 22, at 128.
57. FIL. supra note 18, art. 18.
58. Id. art. 19.
59. Id. art. 20.
60. Id. arts. 37-9.
61. Id. arts. 37,38.
62. Id.
63. NAFTA, supra note 19.
64. Sandrino, supra note 3, at 307.
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investment " 65 The Investment Chapter is applicable not only to the NAFTA states, but
also to investors with substantial business activities in the NAFTA states.66
A. TREATMENT STANDARDS.
The NAFTA's Investment Chapter begins by providing general equality of treatment
for foreign investors. 67 The provision ensures that foreigners and foreign investments in
Mexcio are treated equally as national investors in like circumstances with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or dispo-
sition of investments. 68 The provision also ensures that NAFTA investors and their invest-
ments are accorded at least as favorable treatment as any other investors or investments
from other non-NAFTA parties.69 Thus, a foreign investor in Mexico will not be subject to
different or more onerous operating conditions simply by virtue of foreign ownership. 70
This Investment Chapter also provides that no party shall require that a minimum level of
investment be held by nationals or require an investor, by reason of its nationality, to sell
or otherwise dispose of investment in the territory of the party.7 1 Furthermore, no party
may require an enterprise that is a foreign investment to reserve certain senior manage-
ment positions to local nationals. 72
The NAFTA also requires that investments of a NAFTA party be treated "[iun accor-
dance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security " 73 Thus, foreign investors will be accorded the same security as nationals,
and will not be put at a competitive disadvantage in obtaining permits or authorizations
necessary to conduct business operations. 74
B. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS.
Another important provision of the NAFTA's Investment Chapter is the prohibition of
performance requirements. Performance requirements have been a major barrier to
investment in Mexico.75 The Investment Chapter provides that no party shall enforce any
commitment or undertaking in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, or operation of an investment of an investor of a party or of a non-
party if the commitment is:
65. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1139.
66. Id.
67. Id. art. 1102.
68. Id.
69. Id. art. 1103.
70. Sandrino, supra note 3, at 310.
71. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1102.
72. Id. art. 1107.
73. Id. art. 1105(1).
74. Sandrino, supra note 3, at 311.
75. Hope H. Camp, Jr. et al. Foreign Investment In Mexico From the Perspective of the Foreign Investor,
24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 775,794 (1993).
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(a) to export a given level or percentage of goods or services;
(b) to achieve a given level of percentage of domestic content
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided in
its territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory;
(d) to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of
exports or to the amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such invest-
ment;
(e) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment produces
or provides by relating such sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports
or foreign exchange earnings;
(f) to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a
person in its territory, except when the requirement is imposed or the commit-
ment or undertaking is enforced by a court, administrative tribunal or competi-
tion authority to remedy an alleged violation of competition laws or to act in a
manner not inconsistent with other provisions of this Agreement; or
(g) to act as the exclusive supplier of the goods it produces or services it provides to a
specific region or world market.76
This article goes on to prohibit a party from conditioning receipt of advantages in
connection with an investment of an investor of a party or of a nonparty on compliance
with any of the following requirements:
(a) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(b) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced in its territory, or to
purchase goods from producers in its territory;
(c) to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of
exports or to the amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such invest-
ment; or
(d) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment produces
or provides by relating such sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports
or foreign exchange earnings.7 7
The prohibition on performance requirements is not absolute. A party may still con-
dition the receipt of an advantage, in connection with an investment in its territory of a
party or of a nonparty, on compliance with the requirement to locate production, provide
a service, train or employ workers, construct or expand particular facilities, or carry out
research and development in its territory.
76. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1106.
77. Id. art. 1106.
78. Id.
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C. TRANSFERS RELATING TO INVESTMENTS.
The risk of currency inconvertibility greatly reduces the amount of foreign direct
investment in high risk nations. 79 Currency inconvertibility is defined as an "[i]nvestor's
inability to convert local currency returns (profits, principal, interest, royalties, capital and
other remittances) into foreign exchange for transfer outside the host country."8 0
Industrialized nations emphasize the importance of a foreign investor's ability to make
monetary transfers,81 while most Third World states have exchange control laws to regu-
late the conversion of currency abroad.8 2 The NAFTKs Investment Chapter provides the
guarantees that industrialized states and their investors and firms seek in order to optimize
their investment projects. 83
The NAFTA provides that certain transfers relating to an investment shall be made
"freely and without delay."84 These transfers include: (a) profits, dividends, capital gains,
royalty payments, management fees, technical assistance and other fees, returns in kind,
and other amounts derived from the investment; (b) proceeds from the sale of all or any
part of the investment or from the partial or complete liquidation of an investment; and,
(c) payments made under a contract entered into by the investor, or its investment, includ-
ing payments made pursuant to a loan agreement. These transfers shall be made in a
freely usable currency at the market rate of exchange.8 5 Certain transfers may be prevent-
ed through the goodfaith application of laws relating to: (a) bankruptcy, insolvency, or the
protection of creditors; (b) issuing, trading, or dealing in securities; (c) criminal or penal
offenses; (d) reports of transfer of currency or other monetary instruments; and (e) ensur-
ing the satisfaction of judgments in adjudicatory proceedings.
D. EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION.
One of the major deterrences to foreign direct investment in developing nations is the
possibility of expropriation.8 6 This possibility is a particularly serious impediment to
79. "The inability to convert local currency creates detrimental consequences for investors. For
example, inconvertibility reduces the ability of the investor to meet financial commitments such
as the payment of dividends or the withdrawal of profits from the country where the investment
is located." George Thomas Ellinidis, Foreign Direct Investment in Devoloping and Newly
Liberalized Nations, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 299,316 (1995).
80. Wagner, supra note 15, at 32.
81. Most BIT's prohibit any restrictions placed on the ability of a foreign investor to transfer curren-
cy generated in their business enterprise out of the host country. Edward A. Fallone, Going
International: Fundamentals of International Business Transactions, American Law Institute,
American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, July 8,1996.
82. Sandrino, supra note 3, at 315.
83. Id.
84. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1109.
85. Id.
86. See David A. Gantz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of Negotiation and Compensation for
Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 474 (1977); See generally William D. Rogers, Of
Missionaries; Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Investment Disputes in the Americas, 72
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1978).
132 NAFTA law and Business Review of the Americas
investment in Mexico.87 Expropriation is defined as"[t]he taking of an investor's property
without compensation or with inadequate compensation.' 88 Public international law rec-
ognizes a nation's right to nationalize foreign owned property if. (a) there is no discrimi-
nation involved; (b) there is a public purpose; and (c) the foreigner or foreign organization
is fairly compensated for the investment.8 9 The common problem arising in these situa-
tions is determining what constitutes "fair compensation " 9° The NAFA drafters recog-
nized this problem and appropriately defined the law regarding nationalization in the
NAFTA states. 91
The NAFTA provides that no party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropri-
ate an investment of an investor in its territory or take a measure tantamount to national-
ization or expropriation of such an investment, except when the nationalization is: (a) for
a public purpose; (b) on a nondiscriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of
law and with treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment; and (d) is accompanied by payment of compensation equivalent to the fair
market value, paid without delay and fully realizable with interest from the date of expro-
priation.92 This provision in the NAFTs Investment Chapter marks a significant turn in
Mexico's policy toward foreign investment and recognition of the international laws and
customs that have been in place between developed nations for many years.93
87. Mexico has traditionally viewed expropriation as a major vehicle for self-determination. See gen-
erally Sandrino, supra note 3. Accordingly, they have opposed the customary international law
governing expropriation. Id. Since Mexico's 1938 oil expropriation, the United States has asserted
that the Hull Doctrine is customary international law regarding expropriations. Id. The Hull
Doctrine requires prompt compensation for expropriated property in convertible foreign
exchange, equivalent to the full value thereof. Id. This has been codified in the Hickenlooper
Amendments. 22 U.S.C.A. §2370(e)(1)(1990). Mexcio has generally asserted that no interna-
tional rule existed and that issues of compensation are to be determined by Mexico's laws. See
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A19631 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975).
88. A.A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 50 (1962).
89. INGRID DETER DE LUPIs, FINANCE AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 68
(1987).
90. Id. at 81.
91. NAFTA, supra note 19,art. 1110.
92. Id.
93. In 1938 President Cardenas signed a decree nationalizing the assets of British owned Royal Dutch
Shell and U.S. based Standard Oil of New Jersey. See Wright, supra note 14 at 70. The drastic
measure by the Mexican Government was based on the oil companies' refusal to obey the
Supreme Court of Mexico's order for increased wages in the oil industry. Id. The Mexican
Government's bold move in nationalizing foreign owned oil companies resulted in increased
flight in foreign capital. MIGUEL D. RAMIREZ, MExIco's ECONOMIC CRISIS: ITS ORIGIN AND
CONSEQUENCES 81 (1989). The Mexican Constitution of 1917, which is still in effect today, pro-
vides that "expropriations can only be made by reason of utility and by means of indemnity.'
CONST., supra note 7, art. 27. Mexico took this one step further during the oil expropriations,
excusing fair compensation when expropriations were "inspired by legitimate causes and the
aspirations of social justice." Samuel K.B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment. A
Reappraisal, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 588, 599 (citing Reply of Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs
dated Aug. 3, 1938, in Vernon & Azulaye, supra note 30).
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E. SETTLEMENT OF DISPuTES.
NAFTs Investment Chapter establishes a mechanism for the settlement of investment
disputes between a NAFTA state and an investor of another NAFTA state.94 The chapter
provides that investors may seek resolution of their claims through international arbitration
in accordance with the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Convention or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration
Rules. 95
Under the investor-state arbitration mechanism, an investor, on its own behalf9 6 or on
behalf of the enterprise the investor owns or controls,97 may submit to arbitration a claim
for loss or damage resulting from the breach by the host state of a treaty provision. An
investor's right to arbitration is subject to a three year statute of limitations98 and notice to
the host country at least ninety days prior to submitting a claim to arbitration.9 9 In addi-
tion, claimants must waive their right to seek resolution through any other means, includ-
ing the courts under the law of any NAFTA party.10° However, because the tribunal can
only award monetary relief, investors do not waive their right to seek injunctive, declarato-
ry, or other extraordinary relief not involving the payment of damages. 10 1 The issues in
dispute are decided in accordance with the NAFTA treaty and the applicable rules of inter-
national law. 102
The NAFTA's extensive investment dispute mechanism represents a significant depar-
ture for Mexico with respect to its recognition of international law in international eco-
nomic relations. 103 Mexico historically distrusted private-state arbitration mecha-
nisms. 10 4 This distrust is attributed to the Calvo Clause 10 5 in the Mexican
Constitution, 106 which specifically states that submission to international dispute resolu-
tion is in no manner an invocation of diplomatic protection by foreign governments.
10 7
The implementation of the NAFTA and the New Foreign Investment Law108 dears "all
94. NAFTA, supra note 19, B.
95. Id. art. 1120.
96. Id. art. 1116.
97. Id. art 1117.
98. Id. art. 1116,1117.
99. Id. art. 1119.
100. Id art. 1121.
101. Id. art. 1122.
102. Id. art. 1131.
103. Sandrino, supra note 3, at 322.
104. Id.
105. The Calvo doctrine was developed by an Argentinean jurist named Carlos Calvo. Id. at 327.
Mexico interpreted the doctrine as prohibiting an investor's state from intervening on his or her
behalf against the host state, and excluding diplomatic protection in any circumstances. Id. at
268. Discussion of the Calvo Doctrine can be found in the following books: EDWIN M.
BORcHARD, THE DIPLOMATIc PROTECTION OF CmzENs ABROAD 795-809 (1915); JAMES L. BIERLY,
THE LAW OF NATIONS 181-183 (2d ed. 1938); CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 168-76 (1928).
106. CONST., supra note 7, art. 27.
107. Id. at 322.
108. FIL, supra note 18.
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doubts about the scope of the 'Calvo Clause' in the Constitution...,"10 9 and marks a new
era in Mexico's international relations.110
III. Business Enterprises.
An important part of an overview on direct foreign investment in Mexico involves
exploring the various means of doing business in Mexico. Many different organizational
forms are recognized by Mexican Law. These forms are regulated by Mexico's federal law,
General Law of Mercantile Organizations"' 1 (Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles
[LGSM]), and the Civil Code (Codigo Civil), "both of which trace their origins to com-
mercial and civil laws of Spain."'112 The LGSM applies throughout Mexico, and the vari-
ous state civil codes are almost identical as to the formation of civil entities. 113
IV. Corporate Law.
The most common method for domestic and foreign investors to operate in Mexico is
through a corporation.114 Two corporate forms exist under Mexico's corporate law -
Sociedad anonima1 15 (S.A.) and the Sociedad anonima de capital variable 1 6 (S.A.C.V.).
109. Antonio Garza Canovas, Introductory Note, 31 IL.M. 390,391 (1992).
110. Justine Daly, Has Mexico Crossed the Border On State Responsibility For Economic Injury To Aliens?
Foreign Investment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico After the NAFTA, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1147, 1181
(1994). Daly addresses the contradiction between the Calvo Clause in the Mexican Constitution
and the dispute resolution mechanisms in the NAFTA. Id. Daly argues that Mexico's joining of
the NAFTA is not indicative of Mexico's abandonment of the Calvo Doctrine. Id. However, she
concedes that in regards to foreign investors the point is moot because the NAFTA provides ade-
quate dispute resolution provisions reducing the probability of the United States asserting diplo-
matic protection. Id
111. Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, Diario Oficial, Aug. 4, 1934, as amended June 11, 1992,
reprinted and translated in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: MExIco 290-342 (Foreign Tax Law
Publishers 1996) (hereinafter "LGSM"].
112. Marrero, supra note 17, at 129; Phanor J. Eder, Company Law in Latin America, 27 NOTRE DAME L.
Rev. 5 (1951) (commenting about the development of companies under Spanish Law), has
observed, in contrast to the rule laid down by Coke and Blackstone and which is still followed in
our [common] law, they did not derive their corporate personality from the sovereign, but only
their special monopolistic privileges. Id. The corporate or legal personality came from men asso-
ciating themselves, under the Mexican law, into a "company." Id. All "companies," whether
formed as a general partnership or as a limited partnership (compania en comandita), had a legal
personality adhered automatically to this new form of company, the stock company or anonima,
as it was soon to be called. Id. at 15.
113. Edor, supra note 112, at 129.
114. Humbert Gayou & Robert G. Gilbert, Legal Building Blocks For Structuring Sales in the Mexican
Market, 25 ST. MARY's LJ. 1115, 1126 (1994).
115. LGSM, supra note 111, art. 87.
116. Id. art. 87.
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The S.A. closely resembles the U.S. corporation and is the most formal business organiza-
tion in Mexico. 117 The S.A.C.V. differs from the S.A. in that it can decrease its capital
within the limits set in the bylaws, by a mere stockholder's resolution without the need to
fulfill certain formalities applicable to the S.A. 118 Shareholders of either an S.A. or an
S.A.C.V. are only liable for the amount of capital subscribed. 119
A. INCORPORATION.
Companies incorporating in Mexico must follow the corporate name with the initials
S.A.120 The investors must seek authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior
to establishment. 121 Authorization by the Foreign Ministry is reproduced in a notarized
deed, which represents the combined articles of incorporation and the bylaws. 122 An S.A.
must consist of at least two shareholders, with no limit on the maximum number, and a
minimum capital contribution of 50,000 NP (new pesos), of which at least 20 percent
must be paid in immediately.123
B. MANAGEMENT.
Shareholders of a Mexican corporation "are the supreme authority of the corpora-
tion."124 Shareholders elect either a sole administrator or a board of directors (mandato-
rios) to manage the affairs of the corporation. Directors are usually elected for one year or'
until replaced. 125 If one or more of the directors resides outside of Mexico, it is usually
customary to appoint alternate directors in order to facilitate a quorum. 126 However, no
geographical restrictions exist on where a board of directors may choose to convene.
127
The articles of incorporation normally authorize the board to name a general manag-
er to operate the business of the corporation and should specify any powers that the board
may not delegate. 128 Shareholders have the power to remove directors from the board at
117. Marrero, supra note 17, at 130.
118. Thomas M. Shoesmith, Investing and Manufacturing. Part I: Basic Business Structuring and The
Maquiladora Option, 1 No. 1 MEx. TRADE & L. REP. 13 (1991). Changing the amount of capital in
an SA. requires amending the articles of incorporation and approval of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and, in some cases, the Foreign Investment Commission. Id. Capital reductions also
require publication three times in the Official Gazette to provide protection for creditors. PRICE
WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO "INFORMATION GUIDE" (1995).
119. Ignacio Gomez-Palacio, Some Observations on the United States and Mexican Corporate Law, 3
U.S.-MEX. L.J. 25,27 (1995).
120. LGSM, supranote 111, art 88.
121. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 118, at 84.
122. Id.
123. WILLIAM E. MOOZ JR., AN INTRODUCTION TO DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 57 (1995). If contribu-
tions are paid in kind, the initial capital must be paid in full. Id. If contributions are paid in cash,
a minimum of 20 percent must be paid up front. Id.
124. Marrero, supra note 17, at 131.
125. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 118, at 87.
126. Id.
128. Id.
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any time. 129 However, directors elected by minority shareholders may only be removed if
the entire board is removed. 130
In addition to electing directors, shareholders of a Mexican corporation typically
appoint auditors (comisarios) who are responsible for supervising the board of direc-
tors. 131 Auditors are generally lawyers and accountants and serve the function of corpo-
rate council and financial auditor. 132
C. SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION.
Mexican law protects minority shareholder interests by providing that a shareholder
owning at least 10 percent of the corporate capital of an exchange listed corporation is
entitled to elect at least one director to the board.133 If the corporation chooses to elect
three or more directors to the board, a minority shareholder owning at least 25 percent of
the corporate capital is entitled select at least one director. 134 Similarly, if the corporation
chooses to appoint three or more auditors, a minority shareholder owning at least 25 per-
cent of the corporate capital is entitled to select at least one.135
General shareholder agreements in connection with the management of the corpora-
tion are not recognized under Mexican corporate law. 136 In addition, when important
management issues are decided, extraordinary meetings must be held.137 Quorom and
super-majority voting requirements are often used in extraordinary shareholder meetings
to protect minority shareholders. 138
Shareholders are also entitled to enjoin the implementation of a shareholders' resolu-
tion that is contrary to law or the bylaws of the corporation. 139 Shareholders may also
seek damages for injury to the corporation through a derivative action against the direc-
tors who violate their duties to the corporation. 140 Shareholders filing suit for injunction
or a derivative claim for damages must represent at least one-third of the corporate
capital. 141
1-29. LGSM, supra note 111, art. 144.
130. Id.
131. Id.art. 167.
132. Edward A. Fallone, Going International: Fundamentals of International Business: Latin American
Laws Regulating Foreign Investment SB04 A.L.I.-A.BA. 323, 345 (1996).
133. LGSM, supra note 111, art. 144.
134. Id.
135. Id. art. 171.
136. Fallone, supra note 132, at 345, See Gomez-Palacio, supra note 119, at 27.
137. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 118, at. 87. Extraordinary shareholder meetings must be held to
approve any modification of the articles and bylaws, mergers, or issue of debentures. Id.
138. Fallone, supra note 132, at 345, See Panel Discussion: A Hypothetical Problem on Securities Law, 3
U.S.-MEx. L.J. 93, 102 104 (1995). The articles of corporations with substantial minority share-
holders often provide resolution in key specified areas, such as amendments to the charter, incur-
ring substantial indebted, appointment of higher level employees and their salaries, and may be
approved only by, for example, 60% of the total shares outstanding. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra
note 118, at 87.
139. LGSM, supra note 111, arts. 201,202.
140. Id.art. 163.
141. Id. arts. 163, 201,202.
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C. TRANSFER OF SHARES.
Typically, a corporate shareholder may transfer his shares without obtaining the
approval of the remaining shareholders. However, the articles of incorporation may con-
dition the transfer of shares upon board approval. 142 The board may deny the transfer of
shares to a specific person and in turn designate a different buyer at the market price.
14 3
Mexican law allows a corporation to purchase their own shares only in limited circum-
stances. 144
D. INCREASES AND DECREASES IN CAPITAL
Before a corporation may reduce the minimum authorized capital stock, the share-
holders are required to amend the articles of incorporation at an extraordinary sharehold-
er meeting. 145 In addition, the corporation is required to obtain approval from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, in some cases, the Foreign Investment Commission.
14 6
Corporations are also required to publish capital reductions three times in the Official
Gazette in order to provide notice to the corporations' creditors.14
7
If the corporation reduces the amount of capital, shareholders have the right to
redeem some of their shares in proportion to the amount of shares held by each.
148
Likewise, if the corporation decides to issue new shares of stock, shareholders have the
right to purchase the new shares in order to maintain their interest in the corporation.
14 9
E. SOCIEDAD ANONIMA DE CAPITAL VARIABLE.
Foreign investors may also incorporate as an S.A.C.V. This form is identical to the
S.A. except the corporation is not required to fulfill the formalities applicable to the S.A.
when the corporation increases or decreases its capital. 150 Requiring minimum formali-
ties for the issue of additional variable capital is important because Mexican corporations
are prohibited from owning treasury shares. 151 The procedures for capital increases and
decreases of the variable portion of the capital stock should be provided in the company's
articles of incorporation. 152 Typically, the articles provide that increases or decreases in
capital may be accomplished by a resolution of the board of directors of an ordinary
shareholders' meeting. 153
142. Id. art. 130.
143. Id.
144. Fallone, supra note 132, at 345; See Ignacio Gomez-Palacio, supra note 119, at 27. In the United
States, corporations are granted statutory power to purchase and to sell shares of its own stock.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1994). However, the repurchase of outstanding stock with corpo-
rate funds may be grounds for a deriviative daim by a shareholder if the purchase was improper-
ly centered upon perpetuation of control. Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).





150. Marrero, supra note 17, at 131.
151. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 118, at 89.
152. Id. at 89.
153. Id. at 89.
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V. Limited Liability Companies.
The Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada (S.R.L.) is similar to the limited liability
company used in many states within the United States. 154 The Mexican limited liability
company has characteristics of a corporation and some characteristics of a partnership. 155
The form provides limited liability, like a corporation, but the bylaws of the company can
be drafted in such a way as to give it most of the characteristics of a partnership.156
Organization of a Mexican limited liability company requires the same prior autho-
rization and registration as the Mexican corporation. 157 An S.R.L. is limited to fifty mem-
bers and is subject to a minimum capital contribution of 3000 NP.1 58 These contributions
are manifested by "partes sociales," which are negotiable instruments subject to special
provisions. 159
The S.R.L. is rarely used as a vehicle for foreign investment. 160 The membership
restrictions render the S.R.L. unsuitable for large businesses. 16 1
VI. Partnerships.
Foreign investors may also form a general partnership (Sociedad en Nombre
Colectivo) or a limited partnership (Sociedad en Comandita). 162 In a general partnership,
all partners are jointly liable to creditors of the company.163 In the limited partnership, the
"socios comanditors" have joint and unlimited liability, and are responsible for all decision
making pertaining to the enterprise.164 The "financiers:' on the other hand, are only liable
for the amount of their capital contribution and may not participate in the management
of the business. 165 The general partnership and the limited partnership are rarely used by
foreign investors because of the unlimited liability. 166
VII. Joint Venture Contract.
The joint venture contract (asociacion en participacion) is another method of con-
ducting business in Mexico. 167 In a joint venture contract, a person grants a working
154. Marrero, supra note 17, at 130.
155. Id. at 129-130.
156. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 118, at 90.
157. Id.
158. Marrero, supra note 110, at 130.
159. Id. at 130.
160. Shoesmith, supra note 118.
161. Marrero, supra note 17, at 130.
162. Id. at 129.
163. Id. at 129.
164. Id. at 129.
165. Id. at 129.
166. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 118, at 91.
167. Id. at 91.
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interest in his or her business to others, who provide property or services. 168 The joint
venture contract does not create a separate legal entity like the formation of a Mexican
corporation or partnership.169 The business is operated by an active managing joint ven-
turer (asociante), who is the only one with any liability to third parties. 170 There are no
registration requirements for entering a joint venture contract and there are no require-
ments as to minimum capital. 17 1
The joint venture contract provides some particular advantages to foreign investors.
The form allows the investor to satisfy ownership requirements present in the host coun-
try's laws and allows for better access to, and interactions with, local labor unions, financial
institutions, and the government. 172 Further, the use of a domestic partner yields distrib-
ution channels, marketing practices, and cultural and language niceties. 173 However, the
joint venture may limit the partners' ability to modify their commitments to the venture
and result in a loss of general flexibility.174
VIII. Branch Office.
Foreign investors may also choose to conduct business in Mexico by establishing a
branch office (scursal de sociedad extranjera) after complying with certain formalities and
obtaining approval of the Mexican government, including authorization by the Foreign
Investment Commission. 175 A branch office is not treated as a separate legal entity.175
Thus, the parent's capital resources may be exposed to any liabilities that accrue in the for-
eign branch.177 For this reason, branches are not a popular vehicle for establishing opera-
tions in Mexico.178
168. In a joint venture each party may contribute a predetermined amount of capital or the parties
may contribute labor, expertise, knowledge, land, and resources, or some permutation of these.
JOHN P. KARALUS, INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES 7 (1992). Nonmonetary contributions are often
assigned a monetary value in order to determine the amount of each parties' contributions. Id.
169. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 118, at 91.
170. Id. at 91.
171. Id. at 91.
172. Ellinidis, supra note 79, at 305.
173. Id. at 305.
174. E.J. KOLDE, THE MULTNATIONAL COMPANY, 127 (1974).
175. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 118, at 92.
176. Id. at 126.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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IX. The Maquiladora Program.
The Maquiladora Program was introduced in 1965 as part of the Mexican Border
Industrialization Program. 179 The Maquiladora Program allows foreign investors to
establish 100 percent foreign-owned and managed companies in Mexico.180 The foreign-
owned company (maquiladora) l8 1 may import, in-bond and duty free, all the machinery,
equipment, and tools to assemble or manufacture any product or component. 182 The
final products of the maquiladora industry are generally exported for sale outside of
Mexico. 183
The maquiladora industry plays a substantial role in the Mexican economy.
Maquiladora plants comprise 18 percent of Mexico's manufacturing jobs.' 84 The total
number of workers employed in maquiladoras was over 742,000 by the end of 1995.185
Maquiladoras are the second largest generator of revenue in Mexico's current account, and
represent 34 percent of the total value of Mexican exports.18 6 From these figures, it is
apparent that a substantial portion of foreign direct investment in Mexico is represented in
the maquiladora industry.187 At year end 1995, U.S. $1.1 billion of total foreign direct
investment in Mexico was attributed to maquiladoras. 188
179. M. Angeles Villarreal, Maquiladoras: Mexico's Maquiladora Industry, 2 No. 4 MEx. TRADE & L. REP.
17, 18 (1992). Maquiladoras actually originated in the early 1960's when U.S. companies and
Mexican landowners entered into private contracts for the construction of industrial parks. Id.
Fearing high unemployment, the Mexican Government encouraged agreements. Id. When the
Maquiladora Program was formally established, plant sites were restricted to border zones.
Shoesmith, supra note 118, at 14. These restrictions were later modified, allowing the establish-
ment of foreign-owned maquiladoras throughout the interior of Mexico, except in zones of high
industrial concentration. Id.
180. "Descreto que modifica al diveso para el Fomento y Operacion de la Industria Maquiladora de
Exportacion;' art. 19, D.O., 24 de diciembre de 1993.
181. The term maquiladora is derived from the Spanish word maquilar. Shoesmith, supra note 118, at
14. A maquilar is an arrangement when a miller retains a portion of the flour he makes in return
for providing milling services. Id Similarly, all facilities involved in the Maquiladora Program
involve the processing of foreign inputs. Id. In Mexico, the word "maquilar" has come to mean
performing the task for another. Id.
182. Marrero, supra note 17, at 133.
183. William C. Gruben, Mexican Maquiladora Growth: Does It Cost U.S. jobs? ECON. REV. Jan. 1990 at
15, 16.
184. Maquila Industry Growth, MEx. Bus. MONTHLY, See Q. Feb. 1, 1996 available in 1996 WL 8154789.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. The prosperity of the maquiladora industry can be partially attributed to Mexico's low wage rate.
Marrero, supra note 17, at 134. When it is possible to separate the labor intensive phase of pro-
duction from the capital and knowledge intensive phases, "it is beneficial -- in terms of profitabil-
ity and competitiveness -- to process, assemble, test and package goods in countries with abun-
dant lower cost labor." Id. Wages in Mexico escalated from the all-time low of 54 cents per hour
in 1985 to an average of $2 per hour in 1995. Peso Devaluation Attracts Foreign Plants, MEx. Bus.
MONTHLY, May 1, 1995 available in 1995 WL 8119198. However, the 1995 devaluation of the
peso reduced the hourly wage to below $1 per hour. Id.
188. New Foreign Investment Levels, MEx. Bus. MoNTHLY, April 1, 1996 available in 1996 WL 8155004.
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A. FAVORABLE TARRIFF TREATMENT AND RESTRICrIONS ON DOMESTIC SALES.
Traditionally, foreign-owned companies operating as a maquiladora were permitted
to import, duty-free, all the machinery, equipment, tools needed for manufacturing, and
any raw materials or components, as long as those items were eventually exported out of
Mexico for resale. 189 However, the Mexican Government has liberalized the regulations of
the maquiladora industry in several stages. 190 The limit on the maquiladora's domestic
sales is now governed by the NAFTA. 191 Under the NAFTA, the authorized domestic share
of total sales is being raised by 5 percent each year until 2001, when sales are subject to no
limitation. 192
In addition to favorable tarriff treatment in Mexico, final products exported to the
United States are given favorable treatment under items 9802.00 and 9802.00.80 of the
Harmonized Tarriff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). 193 The HTSUS provides that
tarriffs are levied only upon materials not of U.S. origin and the value added to the origi-
nal U.S. component by processing in Mexico. 194 Traditionally, U.S. owned maquiladoras
have imported 95 percent of materials used in production from the United States. 195
B. TRANSFORMATION BY NAFTA.
Under the NAFTA, the concept of duty-free importation of raw materials into
Mexican maquiladoras will eventually cease. Maquiladoras will then have to pay duties for
the foreign raw materials and components instead of holding them on consignment.
196
However, for U.S. companies using maquiladoras as cost centers, the transformation will
be one of form and not substance. Goods from the NAFTA partners will be free of duty if
they meet the rules of preference, 197 as will the NAFTA goods for all other importers. 198
The NAFTA phases out the duty-free imports for maquiladoras and applies the same
duties as imports destined for all other establishments in order to prevent circumvention
of the NAFTA parties' external duties.199
Asian-owned maquiladoras producing electronic and electrical products will be the
principal companies affected by this transformation, because they import most of their
raw materials from Asia.200 U.S. owned maquiladoras however, should continue to pros-.
189. Gayou & Gilbert, supra note 114, at 1115, 1127.
190. The 1983 Maquiladora Decree permitted firms with maquiladora operations to sell up to 20% of
their production in the domestic market. Villarreal, supra note 179, at 18. This was increased to
50% by the 1989 Foreign Investment Law. Id.
191. NAFTA, supra note 19, at 727. See Q.
192. Maquiladoras: Maquiladoras Will Be Transformed By NAFTA, 4 No. 9 MEx. TRADE & L. REP. 9
(1994). See Q.
193. Marrero, supra note 17, at 134.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Gayou and Gilbert, supra note 114, at 1127.
197. The NAFTA preferential rules of origin determine which goods will be duty-free. NAFTA, supra
note 19, chp. 4. A product classified as originating in North America will not be subject to tarriffs
when imported into Mexico. Id. See Q.
198. NAFTA, supra note 19, at 727. See Q.
199. Id. at 727.
200. Maguiladoras: Maquiladoras will be transformed by NAFTA, supra note 192, at 9.
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per.201 The maquiladora was established primarily with the United States in mind, both as
the supplier and as the export market. 202 In fact, three-quarters of the raw material
imported by the maquiladora industry is from the United States. 203
The primary attraction of using maquiladoras as cost centers is Mexico's abundant
supply of cheap labor and its proximity to the United States. 204 The differential between
U.S. and Mexican wages is expected to persist in the foreseeable future.20 5 U.S. companies
operating maquiladoras will only benefit from the effects of the NAFTA, as restrictions on
domestic sales products will be eliminated. 20 6 Furthermore, new opportunities will arise
for U.S. producers to step in and replace some of the maquiladors' Far Eastern and other
third-country suppliers who might lose their competitive advantage because of the new
duties.207 Finally, there will be an incentive for existing maquiladora operations to shift
from third-country sourcing to North American sourcing in order to benefit from the
NAFTA preferences. 208
C. ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF A MAQUILADORA.
Three alternative forms of operations may be considered when establishing a
maquiladora: subcontracting, shelter operations, and subsidiaries.
1. The Subcontracting Alternative.
The subcontracting alternative is the least capital intensive method of utilizing the
benefits of the maquiladora industry.209 Under the subcontracting method, a foreign
manufacturer must arrange for raw materials or components to be shipped to the
maquiladora for assembly or processing. 210 The maquiladora manufactures the materials
for the foreign manufacturer on a per unit basis.211
The subcontracting alternative is the easiest method of operation because of its quick
start-up time and ease of termination.212 However, the efficiency of this method may be
lost if the maquiladora subcontractor lacks experience in manufacturing the particular














213. Id. If the maquiladora lacks experience in manufacturing the particular product, the manufactur-
er may utilize inadequate technology. Id. Furthermore, the foreign manufacturer may face prob-
lems such as decreased quality and delivery of the final product. Id. If these risks are realized, the
subcontracting alternative may result in a higher cost per unit produced in comparison to the
shelter operation and the subsidiary alternative. Id.
NAFTA: law and Business Review of the Americas
Autumn 1997 143
2. Shelter Operations.
The shelter operation combines the advantage of ease of start-up and termination
associated with the subcontracting alternative with the additional advantage of working
with an experienced operator located in Mexico. 214 The shelter arrangement consists of
three parties: a foreign-based manufacturer needing the shelter services, a U.S. or Mexican
company providing the shelter services, and a Mexican subsidiary of the U.S. company that
serves as a vehicle for the assembly or manufacturing operations. 215
The foreign-based manufacturer needing the shelter services is responsible for supply-
ing the raw materials, certain capital equipment, manufacturing expertise, and manage-
ment.216 The company providing the shelter services handles labor, services, customs, and
accounting.217 The Mexican subsidiary is responsible for acquiring the space needed for
production, complying with all the applicable Mexican laws and regulations and is the
assembler and manufacturer. 2 18
Although the shelter operation has the advantage of minimum exposure to Mexican
law and provides the ability to work with an experienced operator, the shelter operation
may result in less control over technology and product quality and is often more expensive
than the subsidiary alternative.2 19
3. The Subsidiary Alternative.
The subsidiary alternative is the third method in which a foreign investor may operate
in the maquiladora industry.220 The foreign company owns 100 percent of the
maquiladora and is fully responsible for control of the production process and administra-
tion.221 As a consequence, the foreign manufacturer is responsible for providing extensive
managerial support and for complying with all applicable incorporation, real estate, labor,
tax, and insurance laws of Mexico.222
The subsidiary form is often preferred, 223 especially by large foreign companies,
because it allows for total control of every aspect of production. 224 Though this method is
naturally more capital intensive, in the long run the per unit cost of production is lower
for several reasons.225 The most obvious reason is that under the subcontracting or shelter
alternatives the company in charge of assembly or processing will naturally have an incen-
tive to maximize their profit margin, whereas a subsidiary of the foreign company will
operate exclusively as a cost center.226 In addition, the subsidiary may employ the particu-
214. Marrero, supra note 17, at 136.
215. Id. at 135.







223. "Virtually all maquiladora companies therefore are organized as wholly-owned subsidiaries....'
Shoesmith, supra note 118, at 14-15.
224. Marrero, supra note 17, at 136.
225. Id.
226. Gayou & Gilbert, supra note 114, at 1128.
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lar technology and expertise needed to maximize efficiency in the assembly or processing
of their particular products. 22
7
Although the subsidiary alternative is the most cost-effective alternative in the lon-
grun, many small foreign investors are precluded from using this form because of the high
start-up costs and long-term commitment involved. 228
X. Mexican Labor Law.
Mexican labor law should be discussed early in counseling all businesses interested in
investing or expanding operations into Mexico.229 This discussion is especially appropri-
ate as arguments are often made that U.S. investors do not establish facilities in Mexico to
take advantage of growing consumer markets, but strictly in pursuit of larger profits at the
expense of workers' rights.230 Many U.S. investors perceive Mexico as offering a large,
cheap labor force protected by few enforceable labor standards.23 1 The question facing
today's investors is whether labor costs will remain low and whether labor laws will contin-
ue to be sacrificed in order to attract jobs for low-skilled workers.
Mexico has one of the most comprehensive and progressive collections of statutes,
regulations, and policies protecting the collective bargaining and other employment rights
of Mexican workers. 232 Nevertheless, "[tihe enduring alliance between the government
and Mexico's powerful unions has resulted in scant enforcement of Mexican labor law,
particularly within facilities owned by foreign investors."233 However, as a result of the
NAFTA side-agreement on labor entitled the North American Agreement on Labor
227. Marrero, supra note 17, at 136.
228. Id. at 135-36.
229. David E. Dubberly, What South Carolina Lawyers Need to Know About Mexican Labor Law, S.L.
LAw., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 45.
230. Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-first Century, 1983
U. Ill. L. Rev. 633.
231. Bradford T. Hammock, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the National Labor Relations Act:.
A Union Perspectiv4 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L & COM. 127 (1996).
232. Ann M. Bartow, The Rights of Workers in Mexico, 11 COMp. LAB. L.J. 182, 182 (1990). Mexico was
the first country to incorporate basic labor protection in its constitution. Harry K. Wright,
FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MExICO 285 (THE UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS, 1971). In fact, Mexico
has some of the strongest labor laws in the world, including principles relating to work hours,
rest days, vacations, minimum wages and other benefits, occupational safety, discharge of work-
ers, collective bargaining, strikes, and dispute settlement. Id. Most importantly, Mexican labor
law dearly favors employees in all dealings with employers, placing many burdensome restric-
tions on employers. Dubberly, supra note 28, at 42.
233. Lousie D. Williams, Trade, Labor, Law and Development: Opportunities and Challenges for
Mexican Labor Arising From the North American Free Trade Agreement, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 361,
372 (1996). The Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico, Mexico's largest labor organization,
has historically been closely tethered to Mexico's powerful El Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI). Id. at 375. In light of the historical affiliation between the Mexican
Government and Mexico's labor unions, Mexican labor law has provided a setting for continuous
dealmaking and mutual gain for the PRI and for labor leaders. Id. at 374.
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Cooperation (NAALC), 234 which was demanded by President Bill Clinton as a condition
of supporting the NAFTA, this lack of enforcement may not persist indefinitely.235 Some
argue that the NAALC will result in much more vigorous enforcement of the Mexican
labor laws.236 However, in light of recent decisions pursuant to the NAALC, it appears the
NAALC does not provide an opportunity to address the concerns of Mexico's failure to
enforce its labor law, particularly with respect to the rights of employees to organize and to
form unions as was anticipated. 237
Whether the NAALC is an effective tool in addressing concerns about lack of enforce-
ment of Mexico's labor laws remains to be seen.238 The NAALC was not drafted with the
intent of changing Mexico's weak enforcement of labor laws, but as a tool to provide
234. The NAALC was signed by the leaders of the three nations in September 1993, North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 J.L.M. 1499, (1499)[heri-
nafter NAALC], and became effective on January 1, 1994. Id. at 1514. "The NAALC establishes a
tri-national dispute resolution scheme seeking specifically to respond to differences in labor reg-
ulation throughout North America' Michael I. McGuinness, Recent Development, The Protection
of Labor Rights in North America: A Commentary on the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 579, 582 (1994). The NAALC sets forth several principles pro-
tecting the rights of labor, including: (1) the right to organize; (2) the right to bargain collective-
ly; (3) the right to strike; and (4)minimum employment standards. NAALC, supra, note 733 at
1515. Article 27(1) of the NAALC established the Commission for Labor Cooperation to oversee
enforcement proceedings against any nation which demonstrates a persistent pattern of failure to
enforce its labor laws. Id. at 1509. In articles 15 and 16, the NAALC established the National
Administrative Offices (NAO), which are responsible for receiving and investigating public com-
munications or complaints related to labor law issues in the territorial domain of another party.
Id. at 1507. Article 29(1) of the NAALC gives the NAO the power to initiate a formal review of
any complaints and to impose monetary fines (article 39) and suspension of treaty benefits (arti-
cle 41). Id. at 1509,1511-1513.
235. Dubberly, supra note 228, at 42. Prior to the passage of the NAFrA, a process of intense discus-
sion and analysis culminated as a result of the fear that closer economic integration with Mexico
would result in a shift of U.S. investment to that country, and downward pressure on U.S. wages
and benefits. Jorge F. Perez Lopez & Eric Griego, The Labor Dimension of the NAFTA: Reflections
on the First Year, 12 AmIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L 473, 473-74 (1995).
236. Dubberly, supra note 228, at 42. It is also argued that Mexico's currency crisis has created consid-
erable pressure to increase government revenue through greater enforcement of regulations,
including labor regulations. Id. at 41.
237. Daniel Friedenzohn, Note, The "Reality" Faced by Mexican Employees Who Lose Their Jobs: A
Review of The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and Two U.S. National
Adminstrative Office Decisions, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 103 (1996). In two complaints,
pursuant to the NAALC, the issue was whether the Government of Mexico properly complied
with and effectively enforced its labor laws guaranteeing the workers' right to associate and to
freely organize in the workplace. Id. at 111-14. In both submissions, the dismissed employees
decided to accept severances offered by the companies. Id. Thus, the NAO decided it was not in a
position to determine whether Mexico enforced its relevant labor laws. Id. at 114.
238. Id. at 123. "Whether this exchange of information and the ability for interested parties to file
complaints with their respective NAOs leads to better enforcement and fairer trade between the
two countries remains to be seen." Id. at 126. The NAALC is the first time the United States
negotiated an agreement addressing labor issues to supplement an international trade agreement.
Id. at 103.
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insight into how the labor laws of a country operate. 239 Nevertheless, active use of the
NAALC may only generate better labor protection for workers in all NAFTA countries
through the enforcement of labor laws.240 Thus, foreign investors should be apprised of
Mexican labor laws and take such laws into consideration when determining the costs of
investing in Mexico. 241
XI. Mexican Environmental Laws.
Foreign investors considering doing business in Mexico should also be aware of the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, known as the supplemental
agreement. 242 This agreement is a result of the fear that economic growth would come at
the expense of necessary environmental protections. 243
The NAFTA ensures that each party to the agreement has the right to promulgate and
to enforce its own domestic environmental laws.24 The supplemental agreement provides
that:(a) each party must effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations;245 and
(b) each party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environ-
mental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations.246
In addition,; the supplemental agreement created the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, 247 which has jurisdiction to handle parties' claims when there has been a
239. Id. at 126.
240. Id.
241. Dubberly, supra note 228, at 42.
242. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 1480. This agreement is often referred to as the Environmental Side Agreement or
Environmental Supplemental Agreement [hereinafter supplemental agreement]. Almost a year
after the original NAFTA, on August 13, 1993, the Parties agreed on the supplemental agreement.
See Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement. Implications for Environmental
Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treaty Making, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 257, 259
(1994) (citing Keith Bradsher, The Free Trade Accord 3 Nations Resolve Issues Holding Up Trade
Pact Vote, N.Y TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1993, at AI). The supplemental agreement was signed and made
available to the public on September 14, 1993. Id.
243. See Michael D. Madnick, Comment. NAFTA: A Catalyst for Environmental Change in Mexico, 11
PACE ENVTL L. REv. 365, 367 (1993)("economic growth absent consideration of environmental
consequences cannot only harm our environment, but slow down the very economic progress
sought").
244. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 904 provides that "[e]ach party may in accordance with their agree-
ment, adopt, maintain or apply any standards-related measure, including any such measure relat-
ing to safety, the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or con-
sumers, and any measure to ensure its enforcement or implementation' Id.
245. Supplemental agreement, supra note 241, at 1483-84.
246. Supplemental agreement, supra note 241, at 1484.
247. Supplemental agreement, supra note 241, at 1485.
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"persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained against to effectively enforce its envi-
ronmental law." 2 4 8
The relevance of the supplemental agreement to foreign investors should be apparent.
Mexico's enforcement of its environmental laws has been notably lethargic, and thus has
enticed U.S. companies to relocate there to avoid the more restrictive environmental laws
in the United States. 2 4 9 If Mexico's labor laws 2 50 are more strictly enforced, foreign
investors will have to consider the cost of such enforcement when determining whether to
relocate to or to start a new company in Mexico. However, whether the supplemental
agreement will result in increased environmental regulations is yet to be seen. It is argued
that the supplemental agreement will be ineffective in causing Mexico to enforce its envi-
248. Supplemental agreement, supra note 241, at 1490. "[Tlhe CEC is the powerhouse of the
Supplemental Agreement." Alicia A. Samios, NAFTA's Supplemental Agreement: In Need of
Reform, 9 N.Y. INT'L L REv. 49,65 (1996). "The functions of the CEC are twofold- (1) it provides
a forum for request of environmental records; and (2) it resolves disputes concerning non-
enforcement of domestic environmental laws.' Id.
249. See Jane J. Duffer, Dump at the Border, PROGRESSiVE, Oct. 1988, at 24,28. American companies are
lured into Mexico because of their ability to bypass environmental regulations. Id. "It's all too
easy for the U.S. companies to turn a blind eye to such incompetence [of waste handling and dis-
posal] when they know how much money they're saving by disposing of the wastes in Mexico!
Id. Although required by law to return all hazardous materials to the country of origin, American
companies have been known to engage in illegal dumping by surreptitously transporting their
waste trucks to Mexico. See Michael L. Connor, comment, Maquiladoras and the Border
Environment:. Prospects for Moving from Agreements to Solutions, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoCY
683 (1992). Richard Wolkomir, Hot on the trail of toxic dumpers and other eco-outlaws, Texas-
style, SMITHSONLAN 26, 27 May (1994)(reporting on recent incident in which the FBI caught an
American company attempting to dump 171 drums of PCB wastes in El Paso); Gene M.
Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of Nafta In the Mexico-U.S. Trade
Agreement 13, 15 (Peter M. Garber ed. 1994). Elizabeth A. Ellis, Note, Bordering on Disaster: A
New Attempt To Control The Transboundary Effects of Maquiladora Pollution, 30 VAL. U. L. REv.
621, 621 (1996)(attributing "forty-two cases of anencephalic babies" in Matamoros to the
maquiladora industry).
250. Mexico's principal environmental law is the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and
Environmental Protection (Ecology Law). La Ley General Del Equilibrio Ecologico Y La
Proteccion Al Ambiente, D.O., published Jan 28, 1988, effective Mar. 1, 1988, reprinted in
Environmental Regulations of Mexico (General Law Division of Language Services, Unites States
Dep't of State 1995) [herinafter Ecology Law]. The Ecology Law covers environmental concerns
including air pollution, water pollution, soil pollution, toxic wastes, pesticides, conservation, and
hazardous wastes. See Lawrence J. Rowe, Note, NAFTA, The Border Area Environmental Program,
and Mexico's Border Area: Prescription for Sustainable Development; 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J.
REv. 197,200 (1995).
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ronmental laws.25 1 Nevertheless, foreign investors should be aware of the increasing
awareness of environmental concerns, which includes anticipating more stringent enforce-
ment of environmental regulations.
XII. Conclusion.
Mexico's adoption of the Foreign Investment Law and the North American Free Trade
Agreement opened the doors to foreign direct investment 252 Business opportunities for
the foreign investor in Mexico are better than they have been for fifty years. 253 Investors
will make better decisions by considering the cultural differences and the history of for-
eign-investment regulation in Mexico.254
Although this comment provides an overview of several factors to be taken into
account prior to planning a strategy for entering the Mexican market, investors should
consider Mexico's laws with particular regard to the enterprise sought to be formed.
Additionally, obtaining legal counsel who has both experience doing business in Mexico
and established contacts with the Mexican legal community is crucial for the foreign
investor to navigate through the many complex and unfamiliar laws and customs of
Mexico.255
251. See Samios, supra note 246, at 76. "Unfortunately the Supplemental Agreement, as it is currently
structured, does not serve as an adequate protector of the environment" I& "Major shortcom-
ings of the supplementary agreement include its: 1) failure to provide non-citizens access to pri-
vate remedies; 2) lack of representation of non-governmental interests; 3) limitation on the scope
of matters that the panel can address; 4) its vulnerability to political manipulation; and 5)its
deviation from traditional arbitration." Id. See Ellis, supra note 247, at 661-76 (noting that the
supplemental agreement as it is currently drafted will be ineffective in its attempts to protect the
border from the transboundary effects of maquiladora pollution). Ellis points out that that the
primary failure is the inability for the environmental standard to be enforced on an individual
level by targeting the profit margin of facilities which do not comply with environmental regula-
tions. Id. at 627.
252. See Goldman, supra note 1., See also Sandrino, supra note 3.
253. Hope H. Camp, Jr. et.al., Foreign Investment in Mexico From the Perspective of the Foreign Investor,
24 ST. MARY's L.J. 775,800 (1993).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 801; Marrero, supra note 17, at 140.
